


INTERNAL USE ONLY

*mfr*OLC 78-1944
23 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

STAT FROM : Acting Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : Formalization of Centralized Community Handling
of Compartmented Clearances For the
Legislative Branch (U)

1. (IUO) Action Requested: That you approve the attached guidelines and procedures to implement centralized Community handling of requests for compartmented access approval for employees of the Legislative Branch. That you sign the attached letters to the Senate and House Leadership formally initiating this procedure unless you choose to do so by personally contacting them.

2. (IUO) Background: The Community has already been notified via the DCI Security Committee that your Legislative Counsel is the focal point for the processing of requests for compartmented access approvals for Congressional staff. Departments and agencies are now referring Congressional requests to my office for review and concurrence. The attachment formalizes guidelines and procedures that are essentially already being adhered to. It specifies that your Legislative Counsel will certify need-to-know and that your Director of Security will assure uniform application of the security criteria of DCID 1/14. These review responsibilities should assure effective control of the issuance of compartmented clearances to Congressional staff.

3. (IUO) The Special Security Center has requested all Community components to submit current listings of compartmented clearances issued to Congressional staff. These will be checked against the central data base and reviewed to assess need-to-know and the proper application of security criteria. The attached letter from you to the Senate and House Leaderships informs them of recent steps you have taken to stem the proliferation of compartmented clearances; reiterates your continued concern; and informs the Leadership that your Legislative Counsel will undertake a comprehensive reassessment of Congressional staff need-to-know in cooperation with individual committee chairmen and staff directors.

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4. (IUO) Staff Position: The Office of Security has been consulted and is in agreement with the attached set of guidelines and procedures and with the plan of action set forth above.

5. (IUO) Recommendation: That you approve the attached guidelines and procedures and authorize us to prepare to proceed along the lines indicated in paragraph three. That you sign the attached letter to the Senate and House Leadership formally initiating this procedure, unless you choose to do so by personally ~~contacting~~ them.

STAT

Attachments:
As Stated



APPROVED: 21 JUL 1978
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: _____
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: _____

INTERNAL USE ONLY

GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCES TO
THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

At the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, to centralize the issuance of compartmented access approvals to the Legislative Branch, including staff employees of Congress, and employees of the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress, thereby assuring the uniform and strict application of need-to-know and personnel security criteria, and to provide for an accurate, up to date, centralized record of holders of such approvals, the following guidelines and procedures are established effective immediately.

A. The DCI's Legislative Counsel shall serve as the Intelligence Community focal point for assuring the proper exercise of need-to-know pertaining to access by employees of the Legislative Branch to intelligence maintained and controlled within the SI, TK [] systems of compartmentation. The DCI's Legislative Counsel, acting on behalf of the DCI, shall oversee the processing of all such requests and shall validate the need-to-know. The DCI's Director of Security shall review such requests to assure proper uniform application of security criteria for access under the provisions of DCID 1/14.

AT B. All requests received by departments and agencies to grant employees of the Legislative Branch access to intelligence controlled within the SI, TK [] systems of compartmentation will be submitted by the recipient with its decision, to the DCI's Legislative Counsel for review and concurrence. Requests must clearly describe the nominee's need-to-know. Issues arising in regard to particular requests will be referred to the Director of Central Intelligence for resolution.

C. All requests for approvals of access to intelligence controlled within any system of compartmentation for any employees of the General Accounting Office or the Library of Congress will be submitted to the DCI's Legislative Counsel and will be personally approved by the DCI. Such requests must be at the direction of a Congressional committee and by letter from the committee chairman to the department or agency involved, fully stating the Congressional requirement.

D. Access to compartmented information will be approved only for permanent staff persons of Congressional committees designated by committee or subcommittee chairmen, and to selected Members of the Leadership staffs as designated by the President and President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Majority and Minority Leaders of both Houses respectively. Personal staff of Members of Congress shall not be granted compartmented clearances.

E. The following criteria will be used to establish need-to-know:


1. Direct involvement in authorization legislation pertaining to Intelligence Community agencies;
2. Direct involvement in appropriations legislation for Intelligence Community agencies;
3. Direct involvement in reviews authorized by law of activities of Intelligence Community agencies;
4. Direct involvement in oversight responsibilities carried out by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence;
5. Direct involvement in other legislative matters which of necessity require direct access to compartmented intelligence.

In most cases, the need for substantive intelligence can be fulfilled without disclosing the source or method of acquisition. Therefore, every effort will be made to satisfy Congressional requirements for information by providing noncompartmented or sanitized material which does not reveal the manner of collection or acquisition. Direct access to compartmented information will not be approved unless sanitization or the provision of noncompartmented information is shown to be inadequate to meet the Congressional requirement.

F. Access approvals will be valid only so long as they are necessary, and approvals granted for particular requirements will be terminated when those requirements have been met. All approvals will be included in the central data base maintained by the Special Security Center under the direction of the DCI's Director of Security.

G. All persons, excluding Members of Congress, granted access to compartmented intelligence information shall have been the subject of a prior investigation meeting the criteria set forth in DCID 1/14. Security investigations of Congressional staff persons may be conducted under agreed upon arrangements with chairmen of committees or subcommittees, as appropriate. Investigations generally will be conducted by the Department of Defense, the FBI, or the Civil Service Commission, depending upon the particular arrangements made. The agency or department sponsoring the clearance will assume responsibility for assuring the conduct of an appropriate investigation. Security determinations made by sponsoring agencies or departments will be reviewed by the DCI's Director of Security to assure the proper uniform application of security criteria under DCID 1/14.

H. No materials controlled within a system of compartmentation will be provided to any Legislative Branch requester for retention without the approval of the DCI's Legislative Counsel and unless maintained in storage facilities which meet prescribed physical security requirements and are so certified by the Special Security Center.



Director of Central Intelligence

21 July 1978

Date

TO : XXXXXX LLM	DATE OF REQUEST 22 June 1978
FROM : PLC <i>Sent to ER</i>	SUSPENSE DATE
SUBJECT: <i>23 JUN 1978</i> Formalization of Centralized Community Handling of Compartmented Clearances For the Legislative Branch	

NOTES

The attached package for the DCI establishes OLC as the focal point for compartmented clearances. There is: a memo to the DCI requesting approval of Guidelines and of a letter from the DCI to the Vice President and Speaker to initiate the program. NOTE: In the Guidelines DCI approval is required for any compartmented clearance for GAO and Library of Congress and the requests must come from a Committee Chairman.

I understand that RJK is following through on the clearances requested by Senate leaders Byrd and Baker. The Director's letter to the leadership notes that the request is being honored.

When all is approved and signed we propose:

- a. Hand carry DCI letter to the staff of the leadership granted clearances and discuss the best approach to implement the program within the Congress.
- b. Concurrently: (1) The Security Committee circulate the Guidelines to the security components responsible for processing compartmented clearances. Requests will come to us from other agencies through the Special Security Center. (2) A letter over your signature sent to all Legislative Counsels in the community informing them of the program, procedures to follow (basically as now requests are sent by Special Security Center to us for review) and enclosing the Guidelines.

AT

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

NAME Bob Gambino, Director of Security	OFFICE	DATE
NAME Executive Secretary, Security Committee	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY GLC

Signature required on pink sheet and Memo.

great work !!
Separate letter
"person stop"

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/06/03 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320098-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/06/03 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320098-4

SECRET

17 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of Defense,
14 July 1978

1. Admiral Hanson indicated that there were two items that I had asked about at the last meeting which he had received responses on just before this meeting began.

a. Admiral Murphy had agreed that steps should be taken not to reactivate the clearances for Steve Bryen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There was a little vagueness in the way this was worded. Before I sign the letter to Sparkman, I'd like to have someone check with Murphy and make sure he agrees on the way we are going to effect this; i.e., will Defense send a letter also indicating that they will not continue his Top Secret clearance if I send one saying I won't continue his codeword clearances.

b. There was agreement that our Legislative Counsel should handle clearances for all congressional staffers. Let's go ahead and issue that one.

SECRET

E2 IMP DET
CL BY

24 JUL 1978

Registry:

Pls add the ~~following~~
following to the
distribution for 23 Jun 78
(ole 78-1944) Memo to
Dir from LHM:

1- DDO


1- DDS & T

1- OGC





Washington, D.C. 20505



OLC 78-1944/a

Honorable Walter Mondale
President of the Senate
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

21 JUL 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In view of my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, I became greatly concerned by the proliferation of highly sensitive intelligence collected and maintained within systems of compartmentation. I initiated a review within the Executive Branch to reassess the justification for existing clearances and to limit issuing future clearances based on the strictest application of need-to-know.

This same concern extends to the Legislative Branch. As you know, staff personnel of our Congressional oversight committees have been granted access to highly sensitive compartmented intelligence information. However, due to the broadening of interest in foreign intelligence within the Congress, access has been extended to staffs of other committees. It is imperative that a review, similar to that underway within the Executive Branch, be undertaken within the Legislative Branch to assure that current and future access to highly sensitive intelligence information is clearly justifiable.

Accordingly, I have designated my Legislative Counsel to serve as the focal point to review all requests for such access for Congressional staff personnel. His office will contact the chairmen and staff directors of those committees concerned to assess the justification of existing clearances and to establish agreed upon guidelines to assess critically the need-to-know for future clearances. I do not intend in any way to impede or impair the work of any committee which requires access to sensitive intelligence. It is my concern, however, that the need-to-know be shown to be clearly warranted. In this regard, experience has shown that most congressional requirements for substantive intelligence can be satisfied without access to highly sensitive sources and methods information.

Where there is a clearly justifiable need, Members of Congress are given access to sensitive intelligence information. Personal staff of Members, however, have been denied such access and I have reaffirmed this policy. The only exception, which I am initiating at this time, is to grant selected key staff members serving in the offices of the Leadership

of the Congress access since their principals receive sensitive intelligence on a regular basis and require staff assistance. This will include designated personal staff members from the staffs of your offices, the President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, and Majority and Minority Leaders of both the Senate and the House. My Legislative Counsel will be contacting your offices to determine which staff personnel you have designated for such access. I recently received a letter signed jointly by Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd and Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker submitting a request for staff access which will be honored and handled directly with their offices.

It is my firm belief that these procedures will not interfere with the proper flow of intelligence to the Congress, but will serve to enhance the protection of highly sensitive intelligence sources and methods by limiting access to an absolute need-to-know. I would welcome your support to facilitate acceptance of these procedures by committee chairmen in any way that you deem appropriate.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

1 - D/OS


1 - Executive Secretary,
Security Committee

1 - OLC Subject

1 - OLC Chron



Washington, D.C. 20505



OLC 78-1944/b

21 JUL 1978

Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill
Speaker of the House
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

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Security Committee
- 1 - OLC Subject
- 1 - OLC Chron

ER

JUL 17 4 19 PM '79

JUL 24 9 07 AM '79
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JUL 21 3 55 PM '79
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